Beyond  Harm : Abandoning the Actual Injury Standard for Certain Prohibited Takings Under the Endangered Species Act by Giving Independent Meaning to  Harassment by Griffin, Alicia M.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 52 
Issue 6 Issue 6 - November 1999 Article 12 
11-1999 
Beyond "Harm": Abandoning the Actual Injury Standard for Certain 
Prohibited Takings Under the Endangered Species Act by Giving 
Independent Meaning to "Harassment" 
Alicia M. Griffin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alicia M. Griffin, Beyond "Harm": Abandoning the Actual Injury Standard for Certain Prohibited Takings 
Under the Endangered Species Act by Giving Independent Meaning to "Harassment", 52 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 1831 (1999) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol52/iss6/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Beyond "Harm": Abandoning the Actual Injury
Standard for Certain Prohibited Takings Under
the Endangered Species Act by Giving
Independent Meaning to "Harassment"
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1832
II. FEDERAL LEGISLATION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF ENDANGERED SPECIES .................................................. 1835
A. Precursors to the Endangered Species Act ............. 1835
1. The Endangered Species
Preservation Act of 1966 ............................ 1835
2. The Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 1969 ........................... 1836
B. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 ..................... 1837
III. CURRENT VIEWS ON THE SCOPE OF'TIAIM" ...................... 1840
A. The Ninth Circuit Standard:
A Significant Risk of Harm ................................... 1842
B. The First Circuit Standard:
Proof of Past or Present Injury ............................... 1847
C. The Supreme Court Upholds
the Regulatory Definition of "Harm". ................... 1850
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT ANALYTICAL MODELS
USED IN TAKINGS CLAIMS .................................................. 1852
A. Legislative Intent Counsels Against
Using the First Circuit Standard
as the Threshold for All Takings Claims .............. 1853
B. A Significant Risk of Harm Cannot
Satisfy the Regulatory Requirement of
'Actual Harm"for Takings by "Harm" ................. 1857
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO ANALYZING
TAKINGS CLAIMS INVOLVING A THREAT
OF FUTURE HARM: GIVING INDEPENDENT
MEANING TO "HARASSMENT" ............................................. 1860
A. The Scope of "Harass" Under
Its Regulatory Definition ....................................... 1860
1831
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
B. The Sweet Home Analysis Calls for Judicial
Recognition of Takings by "Harassment". . ........... 1864
1. The Presumption Against Surplusage ....... 1864
2. The Chevron Doctrine ................................ 1865
VI. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 1866
I. INTRODUCTION
As new technology and a desire for progress propel us into the
next millennium, a corresponding daily depletion of national and
worldwide wildlife resources perpetuates the frightening biological
problem of species extinction, resulting in "irreplaceable losses" to
medicine, science, ecology, and aesthetics.1 Every species is a part of
the intricate and complicated ecosystem; its stability depends on the
continued existence of each of its components. 2  Each black-footed
ferret, blue whale, and red wolf contributes to the delicate "balance of
nature," a state of ecology that must be maintained for humans to
survive.3 Indeed, scientists have derived much-needed knowledge
from other species: how to increase worldwide food production, cures
for disease, and a deeper understanding of how the human body
functions. 4 Geneticists and biologists have just begun to uncover the
vast resources stored in wildlife that can enrich human life.6 With
each species extinction comes a lost opportunity-one that cannot be
replaced or artificially reproduced.6 Thus, undertaking the protection
and revival of endangered species is more than an exercise for animal
lovers and aesthetes-it is an effort demanded by the human instinct
of sef-preservation.7
1. See George Cameron Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D. L. REV. 315, 321 (1975) (exploring congressional
discussions of the proposed Endangered Species Act and the reasons for its enactment). In
1992, a study estimated that 50,000 species are lost every year, with as many as 4,000 at risk of
extinction in the U.S. alone by the year 2000. See Species Act, Endangered, WALL ST. J., Jan.
15, 1992, at A12.
2. See 119 CONG. REC. 25,668 (1973).
3. Id. at 30,166.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 30,162.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 30,166. Mr. Tom Garrett, Wildlife Director of the Friends of the Earth,
contemplated the consequences of the species extinction problem. He stated:
We appear caught up today in a metastasizing biological disaster. The precipitous de-
cline of our fellow living creatures throughout the planet mirrors our own chance of
avoiding a prodigious calamity. If we cannot contain the proliferation of our own kind, if
we will not restrain our nihilistic and randomly destructive technology, the animals
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The Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA" or "Act"),8 the
"most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered
species ever enacted by any nation,"9 contains a variety of protections
designed to save from extinction those species that the Secretary of
the Interior ("Secretary") designates as threatened or endangered.1o
The Act seeks to preserve at-risk species through three basic mecha-
nisms: (1) a federal land acquisition program;' (2) the imposition of
strict obligations on federal agencies to avoid adverse effects on
endangered species;2 and (3) a prohibition on the taking of endan-
gered species by anybody.13 The Act provides that "[t]he term 'take'
means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."14
Since the ESA's enactment twenty-five years ago, "difficult questions
of proximity and degree ' -l have arisen regarding the definition of
"take," particularly in determining the scope of the term "harm."'6
While "harass" is similarly "vague and expansive,"' 7 it has not enjoyed
such heated debate.
The first purpose of this Note is to orient the term "harm"
within the general dialogue about the scope of ESA-prohibited
takings. Accordingly, after a brief overview of endangered species
which we are [before Congress] striving to save will not survive, and our own 'harvest"
will surely be at hand.
Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Env't of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 93d Cong. 106 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings].
8. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(1994)).
9. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
10. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531. The Act defines the term "endangered species" to mean "any
species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Id.
§ 1532(6).
11. See id. § 1534.
12. See id. § 1536.
13. See id. § 1538.
14. See id. § 1532(19).
15. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995).
16. For example, in Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996), Forest
Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995), and American Bald
Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993), the courts struggled to give meaning to a word with a
"potential breadth [that] ... is indisputable." Sweet Home Chapter of Communities v. Babbitt,
17 F.3d 1463, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1994), modifying, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir 1993) (per curiam), rev'd 515
U.S. 687 (1995). The struggle to define the parameters of "harm" has been long and hard-the
term has seen a regulatory definition, a regulatory redefinition, and a subsequent circuit split
over the meaning of the redefinition. See generally id.; Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural
Resources (Palila IV), 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998) (definition of
"harm"). The issue was partially resolved by the Supreme Court in Sweet Home.
17. Sweet Home, 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
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legislation in Part II, Part HI explores current views on the scope of
"harm" as revealed by judicial application of the term and its regula-
tory definition. A series of Ninth Circuit cases held that showing an
action poses a significant risk of harm to a protected species is
sufficient to sustain an ESA cause of action,18 while the First Circuit
held that only showing past or present injury to a protected species
will suffice.19 Both agencies developed these standards largely in the
context of "harm" analysis, while only cursorily addressing "harass-
ment." Additionally, the Supreme Court subsequently emphasized
the necessity of showing "actual harm or injury" where the prohibited
taking occurs through "harm," but was absolutely silent regarding the
applicability of the "significant risk of harm" standard to "harass-
ment."20 Part IV offers a critique of these two models and an analysis
of Sweet Home's effect on ESA-takings jurisprudence.
This Note then highlights "harassment" in the context of ESA-
prohibited takings and demonstrates the term's independent meaning
within the definition of "take." Part V overviews the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service's regulations defining "harm" and "harass." The
Secretary's final redefinition of "harm" stressed that no liability for
"harm" would be found absent "actual harm or injury,"21 but defined
"harass" as encompassing acts and omissions that create a "likelihood
of injury to wildlife." Comparison of these definitions reveals that
"harm" involves the proof of past or present injury standard, while
"harass" incorporates the significant risk of harm standard.
This Note advocates an alternative approach to analyzing
takings claims-using "harassment" analysis in cases where a threat
of future harm is alleged, and "harm" analysis in cases of past or
present injury. This Note concludes that this alternative approach,
consistent with both the legislative intent behind the takings prohibi-
tion and the regulatory understanding of it, is fairer in application to
both humans and endangered species than the First and Ninth
Circuit models.
18. See, e.g., Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 783; National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23
F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1994); PalilalV, 852 F.2d at 1108.
19. See Bhatti, 9 F.3d at 165.
20. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995); see also
infra Part HI.C.
21. Final Redefinition of 'Harm," 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998)).
22. Id. (emphasis added).
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II. FEDERAL LEGISLATION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF ENDANGERED SPECIES
A. Precursors to the Endangered Species Act
Two statutes predating the ESA responded to mounting
national concern over the extinction of animal and plant life in the
United States: the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 196623
("ESPA"), and the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 196924
("ESCA"). While the ESPA and ESCA addressed the same problem as
the ESA,25 a brief discussion of the scope and lack of enforcement
provisions in these precursors helps orient the ESA in the evolving
field of endangered species jurisprudence.
1. The Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966
In 1966, Congress passed the ESPA, the first law specifically
designed to protect endangered species as a class.26 In retrospect, the
ESPA's provisions seem grossly inadequate to accomplish its stated
purpose of "provid[ing] ... for the conservation, protection, restora-
tion, and propagation of selected species of native species of fish and
wildlife... that are threatened with extinction," because it did not
establish implementation programs or penalties for violators. 27
Although it carried little practical weight outside the National
Wildlife Refuge System, the ESPA's symbolic import was great:
Congress had made species extinction a national concern. 28  In
particular, the ESPA prohibited takings of "any fish, bird, mammal,
or other wild vertebrate or invertebrate animals" in danger of
extinction.9 It defined "taking" to mean "pursue, hunt, shoot,
23. Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed 1973).
24. Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969), repealed by Endangered Species Act of 1973,
§ 14, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884, 903.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 9-10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2809.
26. See Federico Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition Against Takings in Section 9
of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live With a Powerful Species Preservation
Law, 62 U. CoLO. L. REV. 109, 123 (1991). Two years earlier the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and
Wildlife (which evolved into the Fish and Wildlife Service) had compiled the first endangered
species list. See Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its
Effects on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1993).
27. Endangered Species Preservation Act §1(a).
28. President Johnson, moved by the significance of the ESPA, called it "a milestone in the
history of conservation." Sugg, supra note 26, at 18.
29. Endangered Species Preservation Act, 80 Stat. at 928.
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capture, collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, capture, collect or
kill."30 The definition of "taking" did not include the broad terms
"harm" and "harass."31 Three factors limited the ESPA's practical
impact: (1) the taking "prohibition was subject to more or less
unlimited exception at the discretion of the Secretary, 32 (2) it pro-
tected only endangered species living on national wildlife refuge
land,3 and (3) the duty to protect endangered species extended only to
"the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the
Secretary of Defense, together with the heads of bureaus, agencies,
and services within their departments" and only "insofar as [was]
practicable and consistent with the primary purposes of such bureaus,
agencies, and services."34 In sum, the ESPA only protected endan-
gered species living on certain federal lands, and only when conven-
ient for particular agencies.
2. The Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969
Three years later, the ESCA "sought to ameliorate the per-
ceived inadequacies of the ESPA, while retaining those provisions
which gave it strength''3 by banning the importation of endangered
species of fish and wildlife and expanding the government's land
acquisition authority.36 The classification of species as "endangered"
under the ESCA was narrower than under the ESPA, prohibiting only
the importation of species "threatened with worldwide extinction.
''37
As the decade drew to a close, the ESPA and ESCA served as models
of wildlife protection for the rest of the world.38
30. Id. § 5(b), 80 Stat. at 929.
31. See id.
32. Cheever, supra note 26, at 124.
33. See Endangered Species Preservation Act § 4, 80 Stat. at 927.
34. Id. § 1(b), 80 Stat. at 926 (emphasis added).
35. Sugg, supra note 26, at 19.
36. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969)
(repealed 1973).
37. Id. § 2, 83 Stat. at 275. One author, however, argues that the ESCA actually
expanded the classifications of species eligible for protection by amending the Lacey Act of 1900
to prohibit the importation of unlawfully taken reptiles, amphibians, mollusks, and crustaceans
in addition to wild birds and mammals. See Sugg, supra note 26, at 19.
38. See 119 CONG. REC. 30,165 (1973). The U.S. efforts to preserve endangered species
stimulated international interest, giving rise to the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087. Eighty
nations attended the conference and agreed to join forces in combating international trade in
endangered species. See Hearings, supra note 7, at 76, 78.
[Vol. 52:18311836
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B. The Endangered Species Act of 1973
In 1973, despite congressional efforts to protect animals
threatened with extinction, the rate of species disappearance was
rapidly increasing.39 There was a general recognition that while the
ESPA and ESCA embodied sound purpose and policy,4° given their
limited scope, Congress's goal of conserving, protecting, restoring, and
propagating species in imminent danger of extinction remained
unattainable.41 Built on the framework of the ESPA and ESCA, the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 sought to preserve the spirit of the
precursor legislation while developing management and enforcement
provisions to expand the practical effect of the federal endangered
species conservation program.42
The Act, administered by the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service ("FWS") and the National Marine Fisheries Service
('NMIFS"),43 has the broad purposes of "provid[ing] a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved [and] provid[ing] a program for the
conservation of... such endangered species."44 To accomplish these
goals, the ESA first requires a listing of both endangered 45 and
threatened species,46 extending protection for the first time to animals
39. See 119 CONG. REC. 30,167 (1973) (statement of Rep. Clausen).
40. See id. at 30,162.
41. See id. at 25,668.
Since 1969, the lessons learned from implementation of the [ESCA] on a Federal and
State level have prompted the need for basic and comprehensive revisions. Experience
has taught us that, under existing laws, the Federal Government was unable to ade-
quately provide conservation and protection measures to [endangered and threatened]
species.
Id. at 30,164 (statement of Rep. Goodling). President Nixon was the first to propose legislation
amending the ESCA in his Environmental Message of February 8, 1972. See Hearings, supra
note 7, at 75-76.
42. See S. REP. NO. 93-307 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2991. Expressing
his satisfaction with differences between the precursor legislation and the House bill that later
became part of the ESA, Representative Gilman remarked that "[tihe measure now before
us... puts some teeth in our efforts to provide a program for the conservation and protection of
endangered wildlife." 119 CONG. REC. 30,167 (1973).
43. The ESA gives these agencies broad discretion to establish and publish guidelines "to
insure that the purposes of [the Act] are achieved efficiently and effectively." 16 U.S.C. §§
1533(h), 1538(d)(3), 1539(f)(5) (1994). Accordingly, the FWS has promulgated definitions for
twenty-five statutory terms, including "harm" and "harass." See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
45. 'The term 'endangered species' means any species which is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Id. § 1532(6).
46. See id. § 1533(c). The Secretary also has the discretion to list species that "so closely
resemble" endangered or threatened species that attempting to differentiate between the two
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1831
not yet endangered but '"ikely to become endangered species within
the foreseeable future."47  The definitions of "endangered" and
"threatened" species expanded to include a species in danger of
extinction "throughout all or a significant portion of its range,'"48
instead of limiting protection, as previously, to only those species
threatened with worldwide extinction.49 For each species on the
endangered list, the Secretary must issue regulations to provide for
its conservation and has discretion to issue such regulations for
threatened species as well.50 Because Congress regarded acquiring
private land an integral part of conserving those species threatened
by habitat destruction, land acquisition by the federal government
once again became a means of implementing the Act's goals.51 Section
7 of the Act mapped out a critical departure from previous legislation,
requiring all federal departments and agencies to use their powers to
further the ESA's purposes by (1) carrying out programs for the
conservation of endangered and threatened species as directed by the
Secretary, and (2) taking "such action necessary to insure that actions
authorized, funded or carried out by them do not jeopardize the
continued existence' of such species or destroy or modify their critical
habitat.52 This directive applies to federal entities even when species
species creates an additional threat to the endangered or threatened species, if he determines
that listing the 'look-alike" species will facilitate the enforcement of and further the policy of the
ESA. Id. § 1533(e).
47. Id. § 1532(20). Many consider Section 4, the provision for listing species, the "corner-
stone of the ESA." J.B. Ruhl, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered
Species Act: Pushing the Legal and Practical Limits of Species Protection, 44 SW. L.J. 1393,
1396 (1991). Congress itself deemed the listing process "the keystone of the Endan-gered
Species Act." H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2810. In
1978, Congress amended the ESA to require the Secretary to consider the economic impact of
listing a species before deciding to do so, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978), but the 1982
amendments to the ESA removed economic considerations from the listing process, revealing
Congress's unwillingness to sacrifice the protection of endangered species to economic concerns.
See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
48. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), (20).
49. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
50. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d). The FWS, via regulation, has made all prohibited interac-
tions with endangered species likewise applicable to threatened species. See 50 C.F.R. §
17.31(a) (1998). Special rules and permits allow exceptions to the extension of this blanket rule.
See Steven G. Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking Under the
Endangered Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 155, 162 & n.40 (1995), for a discussion of
the FWS's regulation affording nearly equal protection to threatened and endangered species
and the special rules and permits by which the Secretary grants exceptions.
51. See Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species Act: Impact of Section 9 on Private
Landowners, 24 ENVTL. L. 419, 451 (1994). For a description of the land acquisition program
and its funding, see 16 U.S.C. § 1534.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a).
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conservation conflicts with the primary purpose of the department or
agency.13
Section 9, the scope of which will be explored throughout this
Note, prohibits any person from importing, exporting, taking,
possessing, selling, delivering, carrying, transporting, or receiving any
endangered species of fish or wildlife.54 The Section 9 prohibitions are
enforced through Section 11,15 the "teeth' '56 of the Act. This section
gives private citizens the authority to seek injunctive relief against
violators. 57  ESA violators, with few exceptions, receive civil or
criminal fines and forfeit any endangered species taken.58 Federal
agencies have the authority to revoke violators' licenses and permits,
and criminal violators face imprisonment. 59 Finally, governmental
protection of endangered species goes beyond the provisions of the
ESA. Congress provided that the Act prescribes merely a "federal
floor" to regulate the taking of endangered and threatened species,
and states are free to adopt more protective measures if they desire.6°
53. See Gidari, supra note 51, at 451. Allowing federal agencies to avoid protecting
endangered species when doing so would conflict with their primary purpose was a major
limitation on the ESPA. See supra Part II.A.1. The directive to agencies to protect endangered
species regardless of the agencies' primary missions has led one expert to remark that the ESA
"elevates the goal of conservation of listed species above virtually all other considerations."
DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMEN-
TATION 25 (1989).
54. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). Section 10 provides a few very limited exceptions to the
Section 9 takings prohibition. The FWS or NMFS can grant a takings exception: (1) "for
scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of" an endangered species, (2) in
instances of "undue economic hardship," when a party suffers severe economic harm by the
listing of a species as endangered (in which case the exemption is usually limited to a one-year
duration), and (3) for certain native Alaskans who take endangered species for subsistence
purposes. Id. § 1539; see infra Part IV.A and notes 165-167 and accompanying text (discussing
another limited set of exceptions to the Section 9 takings prohibition called "incidental take
permits" added by Congress in 1982).
55. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540.
56. See supra note 27.
57. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g); see also infra Part IV.A and notes 172-177 (discussing the
ESA's injunction provisions).
58. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). An ESA violator can escape both civil and criminal penalties
by demonstrating "a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member
of his or her family, or any other individual from bodily harm, from any endangered or
threatened species." Id. §§ 1540(a)(3), (b)(3).
59. See id. § 1540. The licenses and permits revoked need not directly relate to the
taking.
60. See id. § 1535(f; 119 CONG. REC. 30,163 (1973).
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III. CURRENT VIEWS ON THE SCOPE OF 'HARM"
Although the Section 9 takings prohibition6 has been charac-
terized as a "simple, unambiguous" provision, its scope remains
unclear after twenty-six years.62 The statute defines "take" as "to
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.' '63 One word in
the definition of "take," "harm," has inspired an entire body of
Section 9 caselaw and scholarship.64 The FWS defines "harm" as "an
act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such an act may include
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills
or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."65 Despite the
FWS's efforts to delineate the scope of "harm" prohibited by the ESA,
controversy raged for two decades over what kind of habitat modifica-
61. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
62. Rather than attributing Section 9's controversial and litigious record to statutory
ambiguity and a genuine disagreement over the scope of the provision as written, Cheever
argues that courts have been unwilling to fully enforce the taking prohibition because it is so
"breathtaking in its reach and power." Cheever, supra note 26, at 109-10.
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
64. See, e.g., Davison, supra note 50, at 161 (arguing that the FWS's definition of "harm"
is not facially void for vagueness but is in fact a reasonable interpretation by an agency of an
ambiguous statutory provision); Gidari, supra note 51, at 498 (asserting that the expanding
definition of "harm" threatens "the very underpinning of our society-the right to exclusive use
and enjoyment of one's property'); James Tyler Moore, Note, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon: Defining "Harm" Under Section 9 of the Endangered Species
Act, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 81, 108-09 (1995) (arguing for a statutory amendment limiting the scope
of "harm" to the "direct application of force against an endangered species'). For cases exploring
the appropriate definition of "harm," see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, (Sweet
Home) 515 U.S. 687 (1995); American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993); Sierra
Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural
Resources (Palila B), 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981); Hamilton v. City of Austin, 8 F. Supp. 2d
886 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
65. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998). The definition quoted here is actually a revised definition of
the term issued by the Secretary of the Interior in 1981. See Final Redefinition of "Harm," 46
Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,748 (1981). The original definition characterized "harm" as:
[Ain act or omission which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts which annoy
it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which in-
clude, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering; significant environmental
modification or degradation which has such effects is included within the meaning of
"harm."
Id. The two definitions are basically the same in substance. See Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 284 n.1 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). The
Secretary had contemplated a more significant revision of the definition and proposed a rule
that would have significantly limited the scope of the word "harm." See Proposed Redefinition of
"Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490, 29,490 (1981). After receiving 262 comments opposed to the
proposed rule and only 66 in favor, the Secretary abandoned the proposal and left the basic
meaning of the original definition intact. See Final Redefiniton of "Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. at
54,748; Sugg, supra note 26, at 34; see also infra Part V.A.
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tion would result in a "harm."66 That debate culminated in a facial
challenge to the Secretary's definition of "harm," heard by the
Supreme Court in 1995.67 The Court upheld that definition, affirming
that habitat modification may constitute a "harm" in violation of
Section 9.68 But habitat modification causing harm to an endangered
species is just one of many ways humans can commit a prohibited
"taking,"69 revealing that the question, "What constitutes a 'harm'?" is
merely one small issue in a deeper and more fundamental inquiry-
'"What constitutes a 'taking'?" The jurisprudence arising from the
"harm" debate informs this larger inquiry.
In the context of the "harm" debate, courts have developed two
analytical models to evaluate takings claims.70 The framework
adopted by the First Circuit requires proof of a past or present injury
to an endangered species before finding a "taking."71 In contrast, the
Ninth Circuit's model employs a much lower standard-any act or
omission that creates a significant risk of harm to an endangered
species constitutes a Section 9 violation.72 Parts III.A and III.B
explore these analytical models in turn. Part 11I.C assesses the effect
66. See infra Part E[I.
67. See generally Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687.
68. See id. at 700.
69. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
70. Part M stresses the differences between the analytical models adopted by the Ninth
and First Circuits, although they do share one important characteristic. With rare exception,
both circuits have made the "harm" inquiry co-extensive with the presumptively larger "taking"
inquiry. See infra notes 95, 107, 133 and accompanying text. Thus, while the two circuits have
adopted radically different standards for what constitutes "harm," their entire takings analyses
consist of applying the "harm" standard. But see Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880
F. Supp. 1343, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1995), aff'd, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996). In Marbled Murrelet,
however, a Ninth Circuit district court buttressed its harm finding with a finding of harass-
ment, thereby stretching its taking inquiry beyond harm. See id. at 1367. At the time the
district court decided Marbled Murrelet, a facial challenge to the regulatory definition of "harm"
was before the Supreme Court in Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687. The independent finding of a
taking through harassment may have been designed to retain the validity of the court's holding
in case of an unfavorable decision in the pending Sweet Home case. When Marbled Murrelet
reached the appellate court, "harm" had survived the facial challenge. See id. at 708. See
generally Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's finding of "harm" and found no need to consider the harassment issue. See
Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1069 n.5.
71. See, e.g., American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 165-66 (1st Cir. 1993); Strahan v.
Coxe, 939 F. Supp 963, 986 (D. Mass. 1996).
72. The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that a significant risk of harm is a "harm."
See, e.g., Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1068; Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber
Co., 50 F.3d 781, 784-85 (9th Cir. 1995); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources
(Palila IV), 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988); see also infra Part flI.A. A "harm" is a Section 9
violation. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
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of the Supreme Court's decision in Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon on Section 9 jurisprudence.
A. The Ninth Circuit Standard: A Significant Risk of Harm
In 1978, the Supreme Court enjoined the construction of the
Tennessee Valley Authority's virtually complete $100 million Tellico
Dam because its completion would have eradicated the only known
population of an endangered species of fish.73 While Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill turned on Section 7 of the ESA (setting forth the
duty of a federal agency to ensure that its actions do not jeopardize
endangered species), the implications of the decision reached all
provisions of the Act, particularly Section 9. Despite the TVA's
argument for a "common sense" approach to interpreting the ESA and
plea for a "reasonabld' remedy to the Tellico Dam problem, the Court
declared that "Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making
it abundantly clear that... endangered species [are] the highest of
priorities."' 4  The majority opinion "held unequivocally for the
vigorous application of congressional intent " and made clear that,
when interpreting the Act, the federal courts should not seek to limit
its practical effects.76
Exactly one year later, when a district court in Hawaii
resolved the first claim grounded in the Section 9 taking prohibition,77
it employed a broad and expansive reading. In Palila v. Hawaii
Department of Land and Natural Resources (Palila 1), national and
local conservation groups alleged that the Hawaii Department of
Land and Natural Resources' maintenance of feral78 sheep and goats
for sport hunting in the Palila habitat constituted a "taking" in
violation of Section 9.79 The Palila, an endangered bird species, lives
exclusively in the mamane-naio forest on the slopes of Mauna Kea on
the Island of Hawaii and depends on the mamane trees for food,
shelter, and nest sites. 0 By eating the seedlings and shoots of the
73. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1978).
74. Id. at 194.
75. Cheever, supra note 26, at 135.
76. See id. at 136; see also Hill, 437 U.S. at 173.
77. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila 1), 471 F. Supp. 985 ().
Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
78. The term "feral" denotes an animal that presently lives as a wild creature but was
once domesticated or has descended from domesticated animals. See id. at 989 n.8.
79. See id. at 987.
80. See id. at 989.
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mamane trees, the feral sheep and goats prevented the maturation of
new mamane trees and the regeneration of the mamane-naio forest.81
Without evidence of Palla deaths, injuries, or population
decline,82 the court still found a Section 9 taking based on its interpre-
tation of the Secretary's definition of "harm," even though the
definition characterizes significant habitat modification or degrada-
tion as "harm" only when it actually kills or injures wildlife. 83 The
court's "harm" analysis was brief, without discussion of the "actual
harm or injury" element of the regulatory definition quoted in the
opinion.8 Despite the conclusory nature of the court's holding, its
findings reveal its reasoning: feral animals eat the young seedlings of
the trees on which the birds depend, preventing the growth of new
trees; without continuous regeneration of the trees and forest, the
birds will eventually lack food and shelter; thus, the animals are
"harmed."85 The court's analysis characterized processes that will
cause harm to endangered species in the future as "harm" within the
ESA's proscription.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in
Palila ff,86 but rendered an arguably broader interpretation of an ESA
"taking. 87  After paraphrasing the Secretary's definitions of both
"harass"8 and "harm" (omitting any reference to the regulatory
81. See id. at 990.
82. See id. at 988 n.2.
83. After quoting the Secretary's definition of harm, the court concluded "[t]he undisputed
facts bring the acts and omissions of defendants clearly within [this] definition[]. I conclude
that there is an unlawful 'taking' of the Palila." Id. at 995 (emphasis added). The regulatory
definition of "harm" was slightly different at that time, but its basic meaning is no different
today. See supra note 65.
84. See Palila I, 471 F. Supp at 995.
85. See Gidari, supra note 51, at 466-67.
86. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Pala 1), 639 F.2d 495, 497
(9th Cir. 1981).
87. See Gidari, supra note 51, at 468.
88. The court stated that the regulations define harass as "an intentional or negligent act
or omission that significantly disrupts normal behavior patterns of the endangered animal."
Palila 1, 639 F.2d at 497. Why the court mentioned the word "harass" and a portion of that
term's definition in the opinion remains unclear, as the parties did not dispute whether the
maintenance of feral sheep and goats in the mamane-naio forest constituted "harassment,"
resulting in a prohibited "taking." In paraphrasing the Secretary's definition of harassment, the
court did not indicate that creating a "likelihood of injury to wildlife" by annoying it to the
extent of significantly disrupting its normal behavioral patterns constitutes "harassment." See
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998). Under the Secretary's definition, "harass" means "an intentional or
negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife." Id. Despite the
chain of events that must occur before the Palila suffers harm, the court did not ground its
holding in harassment's "likelihood of injury" language. Perhaps the court included the
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requirement of actual death or injury for a finding of "harm"),89 the
court held that "[t]he defendant's action in maintaining feral sheep
and goats in the critical habitat... violat[es] the Act since... the
Palila was endangered by the activity." By mentioning the term
"harass" and defining "harm" without the Secretary's attendant
requirement of actual death or injury, the court expanded the scope of
"taking" to include those acts that pose a risk of harm to endangered
species.91 Building on the district court's opinion that characterized
future harm as "harm," the appellate court found "endangerment" of
an endangered species to be prohibited by the ESA.92
Seven years later, the Hawaii court that decided Palila I had
the opportunity to reexamine its takings analysis, again in the context
of the mamane-naio forest on Mauna Kea9 The Palila's habitat was
being degraded by another sport hunting animal, the mouflon sheep,
which also fed on mamane tree seedlings94 The district court
narrowly formulated the issue in Palila LI, stating that its single
inquiry was "whether the mouflon sheep [were] 'harming'95 the
Palila."96 Because the endangered bird's population had grown since
the Palila I & H decisions,97 and because all acknowledged that it
would take years for the feeding habits of the mouflon sheep to affect
the Palila's ability to shelter, feed, and nest in the mamane trees,9 8
the defendants stressed that there was no showing of "actual injury"
paraphrased definition as an indication of the broad scope of the taking prohibition, of which
"harm" is but one facet.
89. See Palila II, 639 F.2d at 497.
90. Id. The court did not define or explain what it meant by "endanger." Webster's
Dictionary defines "endanger" as "to bring into danger or peril of probable harm or loss."
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 748 (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added). Since no
evidence of injuries to the Palila was reported, it seems likely that the court, in using the term
"endanger," was indicating that a risk of harm to an endangered species would constitute a
taking under some circumstances.
91. But see Gidari, supra note 51, at 468-70 (arguing that the court's exclusion of the
actual death or injury requirement was not intentional, but that the court had "confused" the
Section 7 obligations of the federal government with the Section 9 takings prohibition).
92. See Palila II, 639 F.2d at 497. Because "harass" reaches a significant risk of harm, the
court could have grounded its "takings" analysis in terms of "harass" rather than "harm." In a
sense, the court ascribed valid "takings" analysis to the wrong term.
93. See generally Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources (Pala I), 649 F.
Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
94. See id. at 1072.
95. It is unclear why the court searched only for a harm, rather than the direct statutory
term "take." Part IV.B of this Note observes that the term "harm" under the significant risk of
harm model has been elasticized to encompass the entire spectrum of takings, such that "harm"
and "take" are synonymous under this model, as it has evolved in the Ninth Circuit.
96. Palila Ili, 649 F. Supp. at 1072.
97. See id. at 1073.
98. See id. at 1075.
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to the Pala that would meet the Secretary's definition of ' harm. 99
The defendants argued that the only effect of the mouflon sheep's
presence in the Pala habitat was a "potential injury," not an "actual
injury," thus falling outside the scope of "harm."100 In response, the
district court explained:
A finding of "[actual] harm" does not require death to individual members of
the species; nor does it require a finding that habitat degradation is presently
driving the species further toward extinction. Habitat destruction that prevents
the recovery of the species by affecting essential behavioral patterns causes ac-
tual injury to the species and effects a taking under section 9 of the Act.101
The Palila lU district court's decision reaffirmed the district
and circuit holdings in Palila I & , stressing that the concept of
"harm" may embody risk of harm and future harm. But this time the
district court stretched "harm" to include those activities that keep an
endangered species at status quo.10 2 Under this definition of harm, it
becomes difficult to distinguish between that which does not affect an
endangered species and that which harms it. The Ninth Circuit
explicitly declined to reach this broader holding °3 but agreed with the
district court's treatment of the suggested dichotomy between
"potential" and "actual" harm in its Palila IV opinion.104 It found the
district court's interpretation of the word "harm" consistent with both
the Secretary's construction of the statute010 and the policy and
purpose of Congress in enacting the ESA.106 The Palila IV reasoning
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Id. (emphasis added). Arguably, the court's response to the argument-that "potential
injury" should be treated differently than "actual injury" offers little clarification on the court's
position. The Ninth Circuit revisited and clarified this point in Forest Conservation Council v.
Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995). See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying
text.
102. See Palila 1I, 649 F. Supp. at 1075, 1077 ("[1]f the habitat modification prevents the
population from recovering, then this causes injury to the species and should be actionable
under section 9.").
103. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Pala IV), 852 F.2d 1106,
1110 (9th Cir. 1988), affg 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986).
104. See id. at 1108.
105. See id. The circuit court reasoned that when the Secretary had redefined the word
"harm" in 1981, he was aware of the Palila I!holding and let that construction of "harm" stand
in his notice of redefinition. The part of the Palila III holding reaffirmed by the circuit court
being no different from the holding in Paila it, the court regarded this interpretation of "harm"
as consistent with the Secretary's construction of the ESA. See id.
106. The court found support for its interpretation of "harm" in legislative history that
declared that "take" should be defined as broadly as possible. See id. It did not consider looking
to other terms used to define "take" to accomplish that broadness.
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suggests that the Ninth Circuit's concern for the technical definition
of "harm" did not survive its attempt to give that term a scope that
corresponds with the congressionally intended scope of "take."
In Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., the
Ninth Circuit was "called upon to resolve.., the scope of the term
'harm"' in a dispute between a group seeking to enjoin a lumber
company from clear-cutting forty acres of timber on which one pair of
Northern Spotted Owls reportedly lived.1°7 The defendants argued
that no "harm" befell to the owls because only harm that had previ-
ously or was presently occurring qualified as a prohibited act under
the Secretary's regulatory definition of the term-as a mere "poten-
tial" injury rather than "actual" injury, future harm did not suffice.108
The Rosboro court significantly clarified the Ninth Circuit's analytical
model for takings claims by explicitly breaking its harm analysis into
two elements: timing and risk.19 While reaffirming its previous
holdings that future harm can constitute "harm," the court recognized
that future harm poses a unique problem of uncertainty.1O Finding
support in the language, purpose, and structure of the ESA, the court
considered mere "potential" injury", too tenuous to constitute "harm,"
but held that an act "reasonably certain" to injure an endangered
species satisfies the "actual injury" requirement, and thus constitutes
actionablel2 "harm.113 In sum, the Ninth Circuit1 held that an injury
107. Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 782-83 (9th Cir.
1995). Again, the opinion does not indicate why the court limited its inquiry to the scope of the
term "harm," rather than elucidating the meaning of "take." The district court had concluded
that the ESA requires a plaintiff to show either a past or present injury to an endangered
species unless the action at issue would result in the extinction of that species. See id. at 783.
Plaintiff had only alleged a future injury to the Spotted Owls that would not result in extinction;
thus the district court refused to grant an injunction. See id.
108. See id. at 784. This argument comes directly from the regulatory history of the terms
"harm" and "harass." See infra notes 206-15 and accompanying text.
109. See Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 784.
110. See id. "Proof' of a future harm necessarily involves scientific and statistical risk
analysis, which can attain only a limited degree of certainty.
111. The court explained that "potential" means "'existing in possibility,'" something that
"may or may not occur." Id. at 784 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1939)). Juxtaposing "potential injury" with "imminent threat of injury" in the context of the
court's analysis of the degree of certainty required to constitute harm, the court explained that
"imminent" means "'ready to take place, near at hand."' Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1939)). While the word "potential" connotes a sense of risk,
the definition of "imminent" reveals that it stands for a notion of timing. In its effort to separate
the elements of risk and timing, the court inadvertently demonstrated the extent of those
concepts' interrelation.
112. The court stated in a footnote that if this were not a citizen suit seeking an injunction,
but instead one brought by the Attorney General seeking criminal and civil penalties, the court
would engage in a different analysis. See id. at 786 n.3. It indicated that in the criminal and
civil penalty context, an imminent threat of harm may not suffice as "harm." See id. It is
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to an endangered species that allegedly will take place in the future
constitutes "harm" within the meaning of the regulatory definition of
that term if the harm is reasonably certain to occur.15
B. The First Circuit Standard: Proof of Past or Present Injury
Under the analytical structure adopted by the First Circuit for
takings claims, "harm" can be found only with proof of past or present
injury to an endangered species. Surprisingly, two district courts in
the Ninth Circuit 1ie first articulated this narrow reading of Section
9-a reading later rejected by that court of appeals 1" but embraced by
the First Circuit."1 In light of the scarcity of Section 9 cases in the
unlikely, however, that the court will have to engage in such an alternative analysis because the
cases involving allegations of future harm are by their very nature cases involving plaintiffs
seeking injunctive relief to prevent the occurrence of that future harm. See, e.g., Marbled
Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996) (issuing a preliminary injunction based on a
showing of a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species); Hamilton v.
City of Austin, 8 F. Supp. 2d 886 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (holding a threat of future injury to an
endangered species insufficient to merit a preliminary injunction); Loggerhead Turtle v. County
Council, 896 F. Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding the future threat of even a single taking
sufficient to invoke the authority of the ESA and issuing an injunction accordingly). The First
Circuit, in American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, developed the competing analytical model for takings
claims in the injunctive setting, as well, but did not demonstrate how its analysis would differ in
a suit seeking civil or criminal penalties. See American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 165-67
(1st Cir. 1993).
113. See Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 784-85. The court seemingly envisioned a continuum of
certainty, running from actual injury (the most certain), to imminent threat of injury (less
certain), and ending with potential injury (the least certain). Under Rosboro, the first two are
actionable, and the last is not. See id.
114. An Eleventh Circuit court has followed this Ninth Circuit interpretation in at least
one case. In Loggerhead Turtle, a Florida district court held "[t]he future threat of even a single
taking [to be] sufficient to invoke the authority of the [Endangered Species] Act" and supported
its holding with a discussion of Rosboro. Loggerhead Turtle, 896 F. Supp. at 1180.
115. The Rosboro decision was reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Marbled Murrelet v.
Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 1996). In that case an environmental group brought an
action seeking to enjoin a logging company from harvesting trees in the habitat of the Marbled
Murrelet, an endangered bird species. See id. at 1062. The defendants challenged the notion
that a future harm can constitute a "harm," citing the post-Rosboro Supreme Court decision,
Sweet Home. See id. The Marbled Murrelet court repeated the holding in Rosboro ("a
reasonably certain threat of future harm" is actionable under the ESA) stating that Sweet Home
"does not affect the vitality of that holding." Id. at 1068. See infra Part II.C for a discussion of
Sweet Home and its effect, if any, on the Ninth Circuit model.
116. See generally California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Swan View
Coalition v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992).
117. See supra Part 1T[.A.
118. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 164-65 (1st Cir. 1997); American Bald Eagle v.
Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 165-66 (lst Cir. 1993).
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First Circuit, a brief look at the Montana district court case 19 that
served as the analytical precursor to the First Circuit model helps to
illustrate the development of the strict interpretation of "actual harm"
and how that standard operates when applied to facts.
In Swan View Coalition v. Turner, an environmentalist
organization charged the United States Forest Service and others
with "taking" threatened grizzly bears and endangered gray wolves by
operating and maintaining roads in their habitat.120 Defendants
sought summary judgment on the takings claim.121 To survive the
motion, plaintiffs had to provide enough evidence to support a finding
by a reasonable trier of fact that the habitat modification caused by
the roads both significantly impaired the species' essential behavioral
patterns and "that [such] impairments actually kill or injure" them.22
The Swan View court held that the requirement of actual injury or
death could only be satisfied with either (1) records of past individual
injuries or fatalities or (2) records of present species population
decline, and only when such evidence established a direct correlation
with the habitat modification.123 After characterizing the "showing of
injury" as "the pivotal element" of a taking, the court implicitly
established that showing risk of harm in the future is insufficient to
withstand summary judgment.124
One year later, animal preservationists in Massachusetts
sought to enjoin the Metropolitan District Commission from allowing
controlled deer hunting on a Bald Eagle reservation, enabling the
119. See generally Swan View, 824 F. Supp. 923. California v. Watt, decided by a California
district court in 1981, was the first case to articulate the strict actual harm standard. In a two
paragraph analysis of plaintiffs Section 9 claim, the California district court held that a "threat
to the continued survival of species protected by [the ESA] ... would ... not constitute a
'taking.'" Watt, 520 F. Supp. at 1387. In a footnote, the court addressed the possibility that the
defendants committed "harassment," quoting the regulatory definition of that term as "'an
intentional or negligent act or omission... annoying wildlife to such an extent as to signifi-
cantly disrupt normal behavior patterns."' See id. at 1388 n.24 (quoting the regulatory
definition, now codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998)). The court omitted the language in the
definition that prohibits creating the 'likelihood of injury to wildlife." See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. It
uncovered no evidence in the record to support a finding of harassment, despite an admission
that the defendant's activities constituted a "threat" to the survival of the species. See Watt, 520
F. Supp. at 1388-89.
120. See Swan View, 824 F. Supp. at 926.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 939. Both requirements come from the Secretary's definition of "harm." See 50
C.F.R. § 17.3.
123. See Swan View, 824 F. Supp. at 939-40.
124. The Swan View plaintiffs presented enough evidence of deaths and population decline
to withstand summary judgment on the grizzly bear taking claim but not on the gray wolf claim.
See id. at 940.
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First Circuit to establish its standard for Section 9 claims.125 The
plaintiffs in American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti claimed that the deer hunt
would result in the "taking" of Bald Eagles through a simple chain of
events: hunters use lead slugs as ammunition; during a hunt, some
deer are injured but not recovered by the hunters; those injured deer
eventually die; Bald Eagles feed on the lead-tainted deer carrion and
are poisoned.126 The district court construed the issue to be "'whether
the hunt will cause harm or it will harass, or cause the Bald Eagle to
be harassed,"' and placed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to show
the deer hunt posed a significant risk of harm to the Bald Eagle.127
The appellate court explicitly rejected the significant risk of harm
standard, stating that, "[b]y requiring the plaintiffs to show only 'a
significant risk of harm' instead of 'actual harm,' the district court
required a lower degree of certainty of harm than we interpret the
ESA to require."128
Two elements of the appellate court's analysis, in fact, revealed
that nothing less than one hundred percent certainty of death or injury
to an endangered species would establish a taking. First, the animal
conservationists urged the court to establish a numerical standard for
determining what actions constitute a "taking" of an endangered
species.29 The court responded, "the proper standard for establishing
a taking under the ESA, far from being a numerical probability of
harm, has been unequivocally defined as a showing of actual harm."13
Second, despite the fact that the Secretary's definition of "harass-
ment ' includes acts that create the likelihood of injury to wildlife,131
125. The deer hunt was intended to alleviate certain environmental problems arising from
the overpopulation of deer in the Quabbin Bald Eagle Reservation, such as over-consumption of
tree seedlings and declining water quality in the Reservation's Reservoir, which provides water
to almost all of metropolitan Boston. See American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 164 (1st
Cir. 1993). The Reservation comprised approximately 125 square miles and was home to
between thirteen and forty-five endangered Bald Eagles at the time. See id.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 167 n.5 (quoting the district court, which did not publish its opinion).
128. Id.
129. See id. at 165.
130. Id. The court viewed "a numerical probability of harm" and "actual harm" as different
categories. This contrasts greatly with the Ninth Circuit opinions, which have held that "a
significant risk of harm" constitutes "actual harm" in some instances. See supra Part llI.A.
Even though the court considered and dismissed the factual possibility of harrassment, it
suggested that actual harm constitutes the only recognized form of taking. See Bhatti, 9 F.3d at
165. But see 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994) (listing pursuit, trapping, and capturing, inter alia, as
other forms of taking).
131. The Secretary's definition reads:
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the court reasoned that "[b]ecause appellants have not shown that
bald eagles.., will ingest lead slugs or fragments thereof during
future hunts, we have no reason to consider whether the ingestion of
lead slugs or fragments thereof... would amount to 'harassment' of
the bald eagles."132
Thus, it seems that the First Circuit's "actual harm" standard
applies to any kind of taking,133 and that the "actual harm" standard
can be met only with proof of past or present death or injury to the
endangered species,134 as any future harm to the species would involve
a numerical probability analysis, which the Bhatti court considered
an improper standard under the ESA.135
C. The Supreme Court Upholds the Regulatory Definition of "Harm"
While the First and Ninth Circuits cemented opposing analyti-
cal models to assess Section 9 takings claims, plaintiffs136 brought a
facial challenge in the D.C. Circuit to the Secretary's regulatory
definition of the term "harm," charging that in promulgating the
definition the Secretary exceeded his authority under the Act and that
the regulatory definition of "harm" exceeded the statutory scope of its
"Harass" in the definition of "take" in the Act means an intentional or negligent act or
omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an ex-
tent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not
limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering.
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998).
132. Bhatti, 9 F.3d at 166 n.4 (emphasis added).
133. The ESA defines ten ways in which an endangered species can be taken: harassing,
harming, pursuing, hunting, shooting, wounding, trapping, killing, capturing, collecting, or
attempting to do any of these things. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). Under the court's reading,
however, its interpretation of the requirements of harm has enveloped terms like pursuit,
capture, and harrassment, even though the ESA made these terms co-equal with "harm" under
the broader term "take."
134. While it must be inferred from the reasoning in Bhatti that future harm will never
satisfy the First Circuit's interpretation of "actual harm," a Massachusetts district court
interpreted Bhatti's holding to mean just that. See Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963, 985 n.37
(D. Mass. 1996).
135. The court conceded that "the record indicates that bald eagles can be harmed by the
ingestion of lead," but declined to find a "taking" absent evidence that the Bald Eagles would
definitely eat the lead-tainted deer carrion. Bhatti, 9 F.3d at 166. The First Circuit reaffirmed
its strict actual harm analysis in 1997. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 164-65 (1st Cir.
1997). There, a record replete with evidence of past deaths and injuries to Northern Right
Whales from entanglement in fishing nets caused the First Circuit to find a "taking" in violation
of Section 9. See id.
136. Plaintiffs were various organizations, businesses, and individuals whose livelihoods
depended in some way on the timber industry of the Pacific Northwest and Southeast. See
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp 279, 281 (D.C. Cir.
1992), aff'd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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parent term "take."137 The Supreme Court upheld the definition based
on the text, structure, legislative history, and purpose of the ESA.138
The Court held that the Secretary reasonably construed the intent of
Congress when he defined "harm" to include "'significant habitat
modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife."',39
Unfortunately, the majority opinion offered little guidance to the
lower courts in the difficult task of interpreting the Secretary's
definition of "harm." Thus, Sweet Home did little to resolve the
conflict between the First and Ninth Circuits,140 which disagree not
over whether the regulatory definition of "harm" should apply to
takings claims, but how it should be applied.141 Both circuits espouse
the "actual harm" standard in the definition of "harm" but have
fundamentally different understandings of what constitutes "actual
harm."
The Sweet Home concurrence addressed the issue of how to
apply the regulatory definition, which it too found valid on its face.143
The concurrence cautioned that while the regulation, by its terms, did
not exceed the Secretary's authority under the ESA, some applica-
tions of that regulation were inappropriate-particularly Palila IV.144
It stressed that the regulation itself limited harm to "actual, as
opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death or injury," and that
application of the regulation must be limited by "ordinary principles
137. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, 515 U.S. 687, 690 (1995).
138. See id. at 708.
139. Id. (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998)).
140. This Note focuses exclusively on the First and Ninth Circuits' takings analyses, as
both circuits offer developed jurisprudence in this area. Notably, a district court in the Fifth
Circuit recently decided a takings claim without espousing either model. See generally
Hamilton v. City of Austin, 8 F. Supp. 2d 886 (W.D. Tex. 1998). The district court, in a rather
colorful opinion, held that for an activity to constitute a taking, that particular activity must
result in imminent extinction. See id. at 893. Refusing to grant an injunction, the court stated,
"while the activities during the pool cleaning experimentation may occasionally annoy, stress, or
otherwise 'take' individual Salamanders," the court "finds no evidence that continued pool
cleanings by the City... could possibly cause the extinction of the Salamanders." Id. at 893.
This analysis makes the First Circuit strict proof-of-past-or-present-injury standard look
moderate. The court denied that its opinion was "extreme," arguing instead that the opinion
avoided an extreme reading of the Act. The court poeticized:
'The Endangered Species Act in its extreme makes no sense./
Only Congress can change it to make this problem past tense."
Id. at 888.
141. See supra Parts ]IL.A-B.
142. See id.
143. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 709-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144. See id. at 714; see also infra note 147.
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of proximate causation" and foreseeability.145 This position charts a
middle ground between the First and Ninth Circuit models because,
while rejecting the idea of limiting harm to instances of past or
present injury or death,146 it requires a closer causal nexus between
habitat modification and resulting harm to the protected species than
does the Ninth Circuit model.17
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT ANALYTICAL MODELS
USED IN TAKINGS CLAIMS
The vast majority of ESA takings claims have been litigated in
the context of "harm."148 The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the
regulatory definition of "harm" broadly, and has regarded the
definition's actual death or injury requirement as satisfied upon a
showing of reasonable certainty that injury to a protected species will
occur in the future. The First Circuit has constricted the definition,
finding harm only upon proof of past or present injury. While the
circuit split over the scope of harm's definition is unsettling, it merely
reflects a deeper problem: fundamental confusion over the general
scope of Section 9, arising from a focus on "harm" in takings jurispru-
dence to the exclusion of the other statutory terms used to define
"take," particularly "harassment." In evaluating takings claims, both
circuits have exclusively inquired about "harm," making it difficult to
apply the Secretary's definition of harm to these claims while main-
taining the breadth of the takings prohibition intended by Congress.149
145. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 709.
146. To illustrate her understanding of the scope of the regulatory definition, Justice
O'Connor explained that habitat modifications that make it "impossible for an animal to
reproduce ... impair its most essential physical function and render that animal, and its genetic
material, biologically obsolete. This, in my view, is actual injury." Id. at 710. She went on to
state that "foreseeable" injury to a protected species will suffice under the regulation. See id. at
713.
147. See id. at 714 (explaining that Palila IV was wrongly decided according to the
regulation's own terms because destruction of the seedlings by feral sheep did not proximately
cause actual death or injury to identifiable birds but merely prevented the regeneration of forest
land).
148. See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt (Sweet Home 1), 1
F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam), modified, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir 1994), rev'd 515 U.S.
687 (1995) (noting that most of the controversy surrounding the statutory definition of "take"
has "concerned the meaning of 'harm' and the degree to which this term encompasses damage to
habitats").
149. In other words, the term "harm" has come to overshadow the remaining terms used to
define "take." This has caused confusion over the scope of the takings prohibition, evidenced by
the heated debate over what kinds of habitat modification the ESA prohibits.
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The following analysis reveals that while the Ninth Circuit
model yields results consistent with Congress's intent and purpose in
enacting the ESA's takings prohibition, in application it has subjected
the term "harm" and its regulatory definition to "ruthless dilation."150
Conversely, the First Circuit model remains true to the regulatory
definition of harm, but the standard it embodies is too stringent for
application to all takings claims.
A. Legislative Intent Counsels Against Using the First Circuit
Standard as the Threshold for All Takings Claims
Deep concern for the biological problem of extinction and a
perceived need to "devote whatever resources were necessary" to avoid
further depletion of wildlife resources pervaded congressional
discussion of the proposed ESA.151 The sweeping purpose of the Act,
to conserve both endangered and threatened species and the ecosys-
tems upon which they depend, represents the firm congressional
commitment to ameliorating the extinction problem.12 Furthermore,
comparing the ESA to its predecessor laws 53 reveals that the 1973
Act, demanding-with few exceptions-protection for a broad range of
species,154 departed significantly from previous wildlife legislation and
made saving endangered species a national priority.155 The Supreme
Court, after a thorough examination of the legislative history of the
Act, declared that "[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this
statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost."156
Congressional reports indicate that lawmakers intended to
define "take" "in the broadest possible manner to include every
conceivable way a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any [endan-
gered or threatened] fish or wildlife."157 Admittedly, the preenactment
150. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also infra note 204.
151. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 177 (1978).
152. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
153. See supra Part H.
154. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)-(d).
155. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 185.
156. Id. at 184.
157. S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 7 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2995. Similarly,
a report in the House indicated that the prohibition against takings in Section 9 of the ESA
"includes, in the broadest possible terms, restrictions on the taking, importation and
exportation, and transportation of [endangered] species." H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 15 (1973).
One commentator observed that while the House and Senate's statements regarding the
18531999]
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
legislative history of the ESA contains little consideration of the
effects of the Section 9 takings prohibition beyond this statement, but
the general indications of congressional intent, an examination of
postenactment legislative action and debate, and an analysis of the
overall structure of the Act illuminate the appropriate scope and
interpretation of Section 9.
In 1978, appropriations for the Act's programs required
reauthorization. 158 Not surprisingly, congressional debate centered on
the wisdom of maintaining such a powerful law for the protection of
endangered species, 159 as the Supreme Court had just handed down its
decision in Hill, a case demonstrating the profound economic conse-
quences the law could have in application.160 Several proposed
amendments would have severely cut back the sweeping effects of the
ESA, but all were ultimately defeated.1s1 Indeed, after rigorous
debate, the Act sustained only minor alterations (which did not affect
Section 9),162 demonstrating continued congressional commitment to
the preservation of endangered species even in the face of great
potential economic costs. 63
Appropriations for ESA programs came up for reauthorization
again in 1982.164 Recognizing the takings prohibition's broad scope,
Congress permitted the FWS and NMFS, in particularly narrow
circumstances, to grant exemptions from the takings prohibition when
those takings are incidental to an agency's actions, the Secretary
preauthorizes them, and the agency develops a plan to minimize the
breadth of the term "take" are often cited, they offer 'little substantive guidance for applying
section 9 in specific cases." Cheever, supra note 26, at 129-30.
158. See generally H.R. REP. No. 95-1625 (1973), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453.
159. Representative Whitten argued, "Congress never intended that this [A]ct be used to
stop the development of our country." 124 CONG. REC. 37,115 (1978). Representative Dingell, of
the opposing view, encouraged Congress to put "the long-term interest of human welfare" above
"short-term, short sighted and single purpose goals that can only be accomplished by destroying
the very life forms that could someday be of enormous benefit to mankind." Id. at 38,126.
160. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 194-95 (enjoining the completion of a $100 million dam because it
would harm a species of endangered fish); see also supra notes 73-76.
161. See 124 CONG. REC. 21,285 (1978) (proposing amendment No. 3097, which would have
allowed federal agencies to jeopardize endangered species when avoiding harm to the species
would impede the primary mission of the agency and to exempt from the Act all federal projects
more than fifty percent complete); id. at 21,353 (proposing amendment No. 3115, which would
have altered the policy statement of Section 2(b) to provide for endangered species preservation
where "consistent with the welfare and national goals of the people of the United States"); id. at
21,356-57 (proposing amendment No. 3113, which would have limited the definition of
threatened species to only those species that "[a]re of substantial benefit to mankind").
162. Although Congress made significant amendments to sections 4 and 7, in the context of
the entire Act, the changes were not substantial. See generally Endangered Species Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978).
163. See Cheever, supra note 26, at 142.
164. See generally H.R. REP. No. 97-567 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807.
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harmful effect on the species in question.165 Because an incidental
taker must submit a habitat conservation plan to the FWS that
demonstrates how the injury to the endangered species will be
mitigated to the greatest extent practicable, incidental take permits
are difficult, time-consuming, and expensive to obtain.166 Thus, while
incidental take permits introduce flexibility into the Act and give the
FWS the ability in limited circumstances to mitigate unreasonably
harsh results under the ESA, they in no way strip the Act of its
power.167  To the contrary, Congress demonstrated its continued
commitment to rigorous protection of endangered species in the same
set of amendments by eliminating all economic considerations from
the process of listing endangered species, making biological criteria
the sole basis for decisions to list animals as endangered or threat-
ened.168 Five years after the 1982 amendments, "266 Members of
Congress voted against [a proposed amendment] giving the Secretary
of the Interior the power to waive the provisions of the ESA when
deemed necessary to protect human life."69 Only 151 members voted
in favor-further indication of Congress's support of the ESA as a
powerful, far-reaching statute.170
While the postenactment congressional action and debate favor
an expansive reading of the takings prohibition, an examination of the
overall structure of the ESA offers the most probative evidence of
Congress's intent to make imminent threat of injury to endangered
wildlife actionable.Y71 The Act confers on both private citizens and the
165. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4), (o)(2) (1994); see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998) (defining
incidental taking). After consultation, the Secretary may issue an incidental taking statement if
the Secretary concludes: (1) the agency's action, with any reasonable and prudent alternatives
incorporated, will not likely jeopardize the continued existence of protected species under the
ESA; and (2) any incidental taking of these species will not likely jeopardize their existence. See
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). The incidental take statement must identify the expected effect of the
takings, the reasonable and prudent measures necessary to minimize the impact, and the terms
and conditions that the agency must comply with to implement these measures. See id.
166. See Davison, supra note 50, at 165-66.
167. See Cheever, supra note 26, at 149.
168. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 12 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2812.
'The principal purpose of the amendments to Section 4 is to ensure that decisions pertaining to
the listing and delisting of species are based solely upon biological criteria and to prevent non-
biological considerations from affecting such decisions." Id. at 19, reprinted at 2819.
169. Donald J. Barry, Amending the Endangered Species Act, The Ransom of Red Chief,
and Other Related Topics, 21 ENVTL. L.J. 587, 590 (1991).
170. See Sugg, supra note 26, at 3.
171. See Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 785 (9th Cir.
1995).
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Attorney General authority to seek injunctions to enforce the ESA.172
Injunctive relief by its very nature targets future actions, and the
citizen suit provision does not require proof of past or present injury
to the protected species to make claims of future injury actionable.173
To the contrary, the legislative history of Section 11 reveals that
Congress had prospective injuries in mind when drafting the citizen
suit provision.174 Likewise, Congress explained that it authorized the
Attorney General to seek injunctions because
[i]njunctions provide greater opportunity to attempt resolution of conflicts be-
fore harm to a species occurs .... The ability to enjoin a violation of the Act
rather than the ability only to prosecute a completed violation will better serve
the interests of the public, the potential violator and the potentially harmed
species. 75
Furthermore, when actions "pos[e] a significant risk to the well-being
of any [endangered species]," plaintiffs may seek judicial relief
immediately after notifying the Secretary, an exception carved out of
the sixty-day notice requirement of the citizen suit provision.176 This
exception demonstrates Congress's intent to stop harm to protected
species before it occurs, and "[n]owhere does Congress [make] a
plaintiffs standing to enjoin [prospective harm] contingent upon a
showing of past injury."177
Nonetheless, the First Circuit declined to enjoin actions
allegedly constituting a future threat of harm to an endangered
species, declaring that "[t]he proper standard for establishing a taking
under the ESA... has been unequivocally defined as a showing of
'actual harm,"' in turn defining "actual harm" as past or present
injury.178 In spite of the evidence that Congress intended to make a
significant threat of harm actionable under the ESA without a
showing of past or present harm, the Bhatti court explained that the
proper standard for a taking had been "defined' as "actual harm,"
strongly suggesting that it conflated the regulatory definition of the
172. Private citizens find this right in the citizen suit provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994),
while the Attorney General receives such authority in section 1540(e)(6).
173. See id. § 1540(g).
174. See H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 19 (1973).
175. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 786 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-418 (1982)) (emphasis added).
176. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(C).
177. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 786; see supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing the
appropriateness of extracting an interpretation of the scope of the takings prohibition from the
ESA provisions on injunctive relief).
178. See American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 165-66 (1st Cir. 1993).
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term "harm" with its parent statutory term "take."19 This resulted in
the court's erroneous application of the strict proof of past or present
injury standard to takings in general, not just takings through
harmO--a result inconsistent with the intended effect of the ESA and
the takings prohibition.
B. A Significant Risk of Harm Cannot Satisfy the Regulatory
Requirement of 'Actual Harm"for Takings by "Harm"
As demonstrated in Part III, the term "harm" and its regula-
tory definition have inspired an entire body of case law and scholar-
ship, revealing a deep confusion over the scope of the term in applica-
tion.' s1 In Sweet Home, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress
gave the Secretary broad interpretive power under the ESA because
administering the Act "requires an expertise and attention to detail
that exceeds the normal province of Congress."182 In light of the broad
discretion conferred upon him, the Court advocated judicial deference
to the Secretary's definition of "harm.183 Because the Court affords
the Secretary's interpretation/definition of "harm" deference,184 an
examination of the term's regulatory history and revision is5 considera-
bly aids in delineating its proper scope.
Uncomfortable with the Palila JJ181 court's interpretation of the
Secretary's 1975 definition of "harm,"187 the FWS proposed a revised
definition in 1981.188 The FWS recognized that one could construe the
original definition to include "significant [habitat] modification or
179. See id.
180. See id. at 166 n.4 (requiring plaintiffs to prove past or present injury to the Bald Eagle
for a finding of "harassment").
181. See supra note 64.
182. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995). See infra
Part V.B.2 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's Chevron analysis in Sweet Home, the Court's
support of the Secretary's interpretive power under the ESA, and an application of the Chevron
doctrine to the "harassment" context.
183. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708; see also supra Part llI.C; infra Part V.B.2.
184. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708.
185. See Final Redefintion of "Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,748 (1981); Proposed
Redefinition of "Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490, 29,490 (1981) (proposed June 2, 1981).
186. Pala v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila I1), 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
1981), affg 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979).
187. See Final Redefintion of 'Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. at 54,748 (noting that "the issue had
begun to appear in judicial opinions and the Service desired to clarify the definition to avoid any
results which would be inconsistent with the Act"); see also supra note 65 (quoting the original
definition of harm).
188. See Proposed Redefinition of "Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. at 29,490.
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degradation" as a prohibited "harm" "without further proof of actual
injury or death to a listed species."189 The agency was uncomfortable
with courts finding "harm" absent proof of past or present injury
because "harm," unlike "harass," is a strict liability taking that
involves criminal penalties.190 To avoid that construction, the pro-
posed revision characterized harm as "an act... which injures or kills
endangered or threatened species of wildlife."191 The FWS ultimately
rejected the proposed definition in favor of the present characteriza-
tion of "harm" as "an act which actually kills or injures wild-
life... [including] habitat modification [which] actually kills or
injures wildlife."192 Because the 1981 final definition closely resembles
the original,29 the redefinition's primary value laid in the FWS's
accompanying commentary, which described the agency's under-
standing of the definition.11 That commentary emphasized that the
FWS drafted the revised definition to embody a proven injury
standard-specifically, the word "actually" appears in the phrase
"actually kills or injures" "to bulwark the need for proven injury to a
species."195 Thus, in promulgating and revising the definition of
"harm," the FWS clearly rejected the significant risk of harm stan-
dard in the context of "harm" takings. 96
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit applies a significant risk of
harm standard to all takings claims while characterizing these claims
189. Id.
190. See id. at 29,491; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1994). The agency explicitly stated that it
was comfortable finding "harassment" without a showing of past or present injury because the
definition of "harass" incorporates an element of intent. See Proposed Redefinition of "Harm," 46
Fed. Reg. at 29,490. See infra Part V.A (examining the differences in the FWS definitions of
"harass" and "harm" and the FWS's stated understanding of those differences).
191. See Proposed Redefinition of "Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. at 29,490.
192. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998). The full definition reads:
"Harm" in the definition of "take" in the Act means an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding or sheltering.
Id.
193. See supra note 65 (discussing the similarity between the original definition and the
final redefinition).
194. See Final Redefinition of "Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,748-49. Perhaps the final
definition only slightly modified the original because the root of the problem in delineating the
scope of "harm" laid not in the text of the definition itself but in the conflation of the terms
"harm" and "take" in judicial application.
195. Id. at 54,748 (emphasis added). The term "actual" connotes the effect desired by the
FWS; "actuar' is defined in part as "presently existing in fact" (as opposed to something expected
in the future). Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 34 (6th ed. 1990).
196. See Final Redefintion of "Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. at 54,748.
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as takings by "harm."'19  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit analysis charac-
terizes injury to endangered species that will allegedly take place in
the future as "actual harm" within the meaning of the regulatory
definition of that term if a party can demonstrate that the harm is
reasonably certain to occur. 198 Thus the Ninth Circuit has come to
interpret "harm" and its regulatory definition exceedingly broadly,
given the FWS's clear intent that courts find "harm" only with
evidence of past or present injury to the endangered species.
Instead of seeking guidance in the plain meaning of the
regulatory definition of "harm" or from the body that promulgated
that definition, the Ninth Circuit has turned to the Act itself in search
of support for the significant risk of harm standard, citing the ESA's
broad scope and structure. While the Palila IV court recognized that
"[t]he scope of the definition of harm is important because it in part
sets the limit on what acts or omissions violate the Act's prohibition
against 'taking' an endangered species," it failed to acknowledge a
difference in the scope of the two terms when establishing its expan-
sive reading of "harm."'199 The court relied on the plain language of the
statute, the overall purpose of the Act, and the "policy of Congress
evidenced by the legislative history [of the ESA]" to support its
holding that the concept of "harm" within the context of the Act may
embody risk of harm and future harm.200 Similarly, the Rosboro court
adopted the reasoning of Palila I and further argued that Congress's
inclusion of injunctive relief provisions in the ESA precluded takings
from being limited to instances of past or present injury to endan-
gered species.201 Rather than granting an injunction based on a
finding of "harassment," however, the court limited itself to the
"1harm" inquiry, °2 and held that habitat modification "reasonably
certain to injure" an endangered species "satisfies the 'actual injury'
requirement."203
197. See, e.g., Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 783 (9th
Cir. 1995); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila I1), 649 F. Supp. 1070,
1072 (D. Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
198. See, e.g., Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 1996); Rosboro, 50
F.3d at 784-85; Palla v. Hawii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila IV), 852 F.2d 1106,
1008 (9th Cr 1988), affg 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986). See generally supra Part lI.A.
199. Palila IV, 852 F.2d at 1108 (emphasis added).
200. Id.
201. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 785-86.
202. See id. at 783 ("[T]he dispute we are called upon to resolve is the scope of the term
'harm.' ").
203. Id. at 784.
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In sum, the Ninth Circuit has elasticized the term "harm" and
the "actual injury" requirement of its regulatory definition to encom-
pass a significant risk of harm in the future based on Congress's
intent to apply the takings prohibition broadly.204
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO ANALYZING TAKINGS CLAIMS
INVOLVING A THREAT OF FUTURE HARM: GIVING INDEPENDENT
MEANING TO ' HARASSMENT'
Under the ESA, "harming" a protected species is but one way a
person can commit a taking, and courts' analyses should reflect that
legislative choice. This Note proposes a resolution to the confusion
over the scope of the takings prohibition by interpreting the scope of
the statutory term "take' as separate from, and different than, the
regulatory scope of the term "harm," eliminating the co-extensiveness
of the harm inquiry and the takings inquiry. Particularly, this Note
advocates giving the term "harassment" independent meaning from
"harm," allowing it to serve a particular function in the Section 9
takings prohibition.
A. The Scope of "Harass" Under Its Regulatory Definition
While Congress left little preenactment legislative history on
the takings prohibition, it apparently gave some thought to the term
"harass" and its role in Section 9.205 The House Report on the Act
indicates that "[take] includes harassment, whether intentional or
[negligent]. This would allow, for example, the Secretary to regulate
or prohibit activities of birdwatchers where the effect of those
activities might disturb the birds and make it difficult for them to
hatch or raise their young."206 The regulatory definition of "harass,"
issued in 1975,207 appears to be directly based on this bit of legislative
history, as it characterizes the term as "an intentional or negligent act
or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by
annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal
204. See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt (Sweet Home 1), 1
F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (Sentelle, J., dissenting), modified, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (arguing against using legislative history to "deprive the
definition of any bounds whatsoever and turn the word into a free-form concept).
205. H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 11 (1973).
206. Id.
207. The agency issued the original definition of "harm" at the same time. See 40 Fed. Reg.
44,412, 44,412-16 (1975).
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behavior patterns which include, but are not limited to, breeding,
feeding, or sheltering.''208
Comparing this definition to a proposed definition of "harass"
offered by the FWS two months earlier reveals the intended scope of
the final definition.29 The proposed definition would have character-
ized all actions (regardless of intent or negligence) that either "actu-
ally or potentially harm[ ]" endangered species through death, injury,
or seriously disruptive annoyance, as prohibited "harassment."210
However, in September 1975, when the agency issued the first set of
definitions, it broke the contents of the proposed definition of "harass"
into two distinct categories: "harm" and "harass."211 The concepts of
"actual harm" and death appeared only in the definition of "harm,"
while "harassment' was limited to acts intentionally or negligently
causing a "likelihood of injury.,,212 The FWS explicitly noted that, in
promulgating these two different definitions, it intended to make
"harass" applicable to those acts "with the potential for injury," and
"harm" applicable to acts "which actually (as opposed to potentially),
cause injury," revealing its view of "actual" and "potential" harm as
mutually exclusive categories.213 'Potential" means "having the
capacity or a strong possibility for development into a state of
actuality.''214 The agency's stated intention of making "harass"
applicable to potential injuries directly implicates the significant risk
of harm standard.215
208. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998). The promulgation notice issued by the Secretary, however,
did not offer any guidance as to how the agency formulated this definition. The original
definition of "harass" remains in effect today, with an exemption added for normal animal
husbandry practices-an amendment effective October 13, 1998. See Captive-bred Wildlife
Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 48,634, 48,634 (1998); see also WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1310 (3d ed. 1993) (defining "likelihood" as "probability").
209. See 40 Fed. Reg. 28,714, 28,714 (1975) (proposed July 8, 1975).
210. Id. (emphasis added) (defining "'[h ] arass' in the definition of 'take' [as] an act which
either actually or potentially harms wildlife by killing or injuring it, or by annoying it to such an
extent as to cause serious disruption in essential behavior patterns, such as feeding, breeding or
sheltering") Id.
211. Compare the original definition of "harm," quoted in the Proposed Redefinition of
"Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490, 29,490 (1981), with the definition of "harass," found at 50 C.F.R. §
17.3.
212. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
213. 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,413 (1975). But see Gidari, supra note 51, at 483 (opining that
proof of actual injury is necessary for takings by "harm" and "harass); Moore, supra note 64, at
103 (insisting that "harassment" requires proof of actual injury, but offering no evidence in
support of that contention).
214. WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1775 (3d ed. 1993).
215. The phrases "significant risk" and "strong possibility" connote the same degree of
likelihood in the future.
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Both "harm" and "harassment" constitute Section 9 viola-
tions.216 Although the required evidentiary showing of injury for
"harass" is much lower than that for "harm,' 217 its intent requirement
keeps "harass" from conceptually swallowing "harm," giving the terms
independent significance.218 The FWS elaborated on this point in the
commentary accompanying the 1981 proposed redefinition of
"harm."219 It explained that, while showing just a "likelihood of injury"
meets the definition of "harass," "it will not result in criminal liability
for habitat modification unless . . . the defendant [also] knew or
reasonably should have known20 that his actions would be likely to
injure" endangered or threatened species.21 It noted that in contrast,
once the higher evidentiary burden under "harm" (a showing of actual
death or injury) is met, a Section 9 transgressor becomes subject to
criminal penalties without a further showing of fault. 2
216. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
217. See Proposed Redefinition of "Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490, 29,491 (1981). The
assertion that the evidentiary showing under "harass" is lower than that under "harm" comes
from two observations: (1) "harassment" may be shown when there is a risk of injury, whereas
harm's threshold is "actual injury;" and (2) an animal can be "harassed" by a significant
"disruption" of its "normal" behavioral patterns, whereas an animal can only be "harmed" by a
significant "impairment" of its "essential" behavioral patterns. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
218. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (defining "harass"). Scholars dispute which definition-"harm" or
"harass"--has a more stringent standard of proof, due to the interplay between the degree of
harm element and the fault/no fault requirements. Compare Gidari, supra note 51, at 191
(arguing that the definition of "harass" is broader than the definition of "harm"), with Moore,
supra note 64, at 103 (arguing that "the standard of proof required under 'harass' is more
stringent than the standard required under harm'").
219. See Proposed Redefinition of "Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. at 29,491.
220. The original promulgation notice of the definition of "harass" did not explore the
meaning of the definition's intent or negligence requirement. See id. In 1981, the commentary
accompanying the proposed redefinition of "harm" gave the FWS the opportunity to reexamine
harass's intent requirement. As noted in the text, the FWS deems the intent requirement met
upon a showing that the "defendant knew or reasonably should have known" the negative
consequences of his actions. Id. This seems to directly refute one commentator's interpretation
of "harass" as including acts "creat[ing] the requisite likelihood of injury to wildlife... even if
the person had no knowledge, or reason to know, that their [sic] act or omission created the
requisite injury to wildlife." Davison, supra note 50, at 238 n.136. Noting that the FWS's
official definition of "harass" defines neither "intentional" nor "negligent," Davison criticizes the
FWS for its oversight, arguing that harass's fault requirement is meaningless because "intent"
is often defined to mean nothing more than consciousness. See id.
221. Proposed Redefinition of 'Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. at 29,491. These comments from the
FWS, the agency that promulgated the definitions of "harass" and "harm," explicitly confirm the
critical point that the term "harassment' applies in the habitat modification context. Some
commentators have argued that because the words "habitat modification" appear in the
definition of "harm" and not in the definition of "harass," only a finding of "harm" provides
redress for claims of habitat modification. See, e.g., Gidari, supra note 51, at 482 (arguing that
harassment has no applicability in the habitat modification context because "[t]he definition of
harass specifically excluded habitat modification from its coverage").
222. See Proposed Redefinition of "Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. at 29,491.
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On September 11, 1998, the FWS brought new attention to
"harassment' by adding to its original definition a limited exclusion
for certain human interaction with captive wildlife.2s The FWS
revised the definition because it worried that generally accepted
husbandry practices, breeding procedures, and provision of veterinary
care inevitably "disrupt normal behavioral patterns," technically
constituting a Section 9 violation by "harassment."' ' 4  The agency
reasoned that the purpose of the ESA required revision of the
definition of "harass" to allow for human interaction with captive
endangered wildlife when such interaction is necessary for the proper
care and maintenance of a species and not likely to cause it injury.2-
Significantly, the FWS adopted the original definition of "harass"
completely without alteration, simply appending the exceptions for
captive wildlife to the end of that original language-thereby demon-
strating its continued support for the original definition and belief in
its vitality.26
In sum, the FWS has already fleshed out the meaning of the
word "harass" as Congress used it to define the term "take."227 The
agency has done so in a way that gives "harm" and "harass" separate
spheres of operation, with different evidentiary thresholds and fault
requirements.2 8 Courts should defer to the FWS's work in this area
and breathe life into the statutory term "harass" by abandoning the
actual injury standard for claims involving only a threat of future
injury.
223. See Captive-bred Wildlife Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 48,634, 48,634 (1998). The
regulation became effective October 13, 1998. See id.
224. See id. at 48,636.
225. See id.
226. The revised definition now reads:
"Harass" in the definition of "take" in the Act means an intentional or negligent act or
omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an ex-
tent as to significantly disrupt normal behavior patterns which include, but are not lim-
ited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering. This definition, when applied to captive wildlife,
does not include generally accepted: (1) Animal husbandry practices that meet or exceed
the minimum standards for facilities and care under the Animal Welfare Act, (2)
Breeding procedures, or (3) Provisions of veterinary care for confining, tranquilizing, or
anesthetizing, when such practices, procedures, or provisions are not likely to result in
injury to the wildlife.
Id. at 48,639-40.
227. See supra note 206 and accompanying text; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
228. See supra notes 211-222 and accompanying text.
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B. The Sweet Home Analysis Calls for Judicial Recognition of
Takings by "Harassment"
The Supreme Court's Sweet Home decision serves as a model
analysis for courts faced with the issue of whether to defer to the
FWS's interpretation of a Section 9 takings term.29 Although the
Court focused on the viability of the definition of "harm," one may
easily analogize to the "harassment" context. In this way, Sweet
Home is quite instructive on the appropriate judicial application of
the FWS's definition of "harassment." Two factors weighed heavily in
the Court's Sweet Home analysis: (1) the statutory context of the
terms used to define "take"230 and (2) the Chevron doctrine.211
1. The Presumption Against Surplusage
The presumption against surplusage, a traditional tool of
statutory construction,232 expresses judicial reluctance to adopt an
interpretation of a congressional enactment that renders superfluous
another portion of the same law.233 In Sweet Home, the majority
reasoned that the statutory context of "harm" "suggests that Congress
meant that term to serve a particular function in the ESA, consistent
with but distinct from the functions of the other verbs used to define
'take."' Moreover, the Court indicated that "harm" should have "a
character of its own not to be submerged by its association."24 When
"harm" is interpreted to incorporate a significant risk of harm
standard, as the Ninth Circuit has done, "harassment," defined as
acts causing a "likelihood of injury," serves no independent function in
the takings prohibition-it is rendered superfluous.235 If "harm" and
229. See generally Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
230. See id. at 702.
231. See id. at 708.
232. See Bradford C. Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction:
Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies,
86 KY. L.J. 524, 601-02 (1998).
233. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988).
234. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 702 (quoting Russel Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S.
514, 519 (1923)).
235. While the presumption against surplusage has been employed by the Supreme Court
in the takings prohibition context, D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Mivka argued persuasively against
its use in deciphering Section 9:
There is no reasonable definition of the word "harm" (or, for that matter, the word "har-
ass') that would not render superfluous some of the other defined terms. For example,
one cannot "kill" or "wound" an animal without also "harming" it, even under the nar-
rowest conceivable interpretation of "harm."
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"harass" are interpreted consistently with their regulatory definitions,
however, they retain individual character--'harm" applying to claims
involving proof of past or present injury, and "harass" (with its fault
requirement) applying to claims where only a threat of future injury
can be shown.
2. The Chevron Doctrine
Judicial review of an agency's construction of a statute
Congress entrusts it to administer follows the deferential approach
set out by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.236 Chevron stands for the proposition
that a court must defer to an agency's resolution of a specific statu-
tory question and not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision where there is statutory silence or ambiguity with respect to
the specific question and the agency's interpretation of the statute
offers a "permissible construction" or a "reasonable interpretation" of
the statute.237 The Sweet Home analysis reflects the underlying
rationale of the Chevron doctrine:
When it enacted the ESA, Congress delegated broad administrative and inter-
pretive power to the Secretary .... The proper interpretation of "harm" in-
volves a complex policy choice. When Congress has entrusted the Secretary
with such broad discretion, we are especially reluctant to substitute our views
of wise policy for his. 3 8
The Supreme Court has thus indicated that the judiciary
should afford the Secretary great deference in interpreting the terms
used to define "take." Thus, the key issue becomes whether the
FWS's definition of "harass" reasonably interprets the ESA. It clearly
does. The agency gleaned the definition in question from an illustra-
tion of "harassment" in the legislative history of the Act.239 The very
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Mivka,
C.J., dissenting), modifying, 1 F.3d. 1 (D.C. Cir 1993) (per curiam), rev'd 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
The FWS has also recognized that no matter how it defines several of the verbs Congress used
to define "take," considerable overlap will result in some instances. See Final Redefinition of
"Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,749 (1981).
236. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See also Sweet Home Chapter of Communities v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 7 (1993) (per curiam)
(Mivka, C.J., dissenting), modified, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995)..
237. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45.
238. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708.
239. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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structure of the statute and its injunction provisions require a
recognition that a risk of harm in the future must be actionable, at
least in some circumstances.24° And, given the broad legislative
purpose of the Act, incorporating a likelihood of injury/significant risk
of harm standard in the takings prohibition in no way threatens the
Act's goal of preserving endangered species and the ecosystems upon
which they depend.41 To the contrary, a strict actual harm standard
for all takings would disserve the ESA's purpose, as species already
threatened with extinction would have to undergo further harm and
depletion before becoming entitled to the protections of the ESA.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current interpretive controversy reveals that a new
approach to analyzing takings claims is needed. This Note has shown
that while the First Circuit model is well suited to "harm" claims and
the Ninth Circuit model appropriately applies to claims of "harass-
ment," neither model is appropriate for use in all forms of takings
claims. When applied to all takings claims, the Ninth Circuit model
unfairly subjects defendants to strict liability for harm to protected
species not yet sustained, while the First Circuit model unduly
restricts the scope of the Section 9 takings prohibition by requiring an
already endangered species to suffer further harm before providing a
remedy. While the legislative history and structure of the ESA reveal
that a future threat of harm must be actionable in some circum-
stances, applying the significant risk of harm standard in the
"harassment!' context, rather than in the "harm" context, alleviates
the harshness of such a low standard in application because it also
requires showing intent or negligence. Similarly, retaining the proof
of past or present injury standard for claims of "harm" takings
ensures that defendants will not be held strictly liable unless a
protected species has sustained palpable damage.
This Note advocates abandoning the myopic view of all takings
claims as "harm" and welcoming the concept of "harassment" as
developed by the FWS. Consistent with the Act, which defined "take'
240. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
241. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
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as both "harm" and "harass," and the regulatory understanding of
these terms, this approach is arguably fair to both humans and
endangered species.
Alicia M. Griffin-
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